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Abstract— In social-ecological  systems research the use  of 
natural  resources  is  typically  studied  on either a  conceptual 
(theory) or a detailed level (case studies). We use agent-based 
modelling  to  take  an  approach  that  is  situated  in  between. 
With this we aim to generate understanding that goes beyond 
the case, while being sensitive to contextual aspects of a given 
social  dilemma  situation.  Our  model  combines  a  theoretical 
model of norm-driven cooperation with a case-specific  model 
of  an  irrigation  dilemma. The  theoretical  model  is 
contextualised by using case empirics to investigate the role of 
cooperation for the performance of a rice growing community. 
Particularly,  for  this  conference,  we  focus  on  the  effect  of 
introducing  ecological  complexity  by  embedding  empirical  
based resource dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
he behaviour of humans affects and is affected by the 
natural  environment  and  other  living  beings.  Human 
behaviour  strongly  shapes  ecosystems  while  at  the  same 
time  being  dependent  on  them.  This  makes 
human-environment  systems  tightly  coupled 
social-ecological systems (SES). SES studies typically focus 
on real world problems, such as sustainable use of natural  
resources with a complex adaptive systems lens.  However, 
much SES research is often based on either simple abstract 
models or complex, rich descriptive case studies. This limits 
our capacity to develop solutions to real world problems that 
take  both  complexity and  context  of a  SES into  account 
while being applicable to a wider  range of SES. There is 
thus a need to generate understanding that  taps from both 
theories and case studies. Particularly, to identify what level 
of complexity and what contextual factors are relevant.
T
We  apply  agent-based  modelling  (ABM)  to  connect 
theoretical explanations with real world problem situations 
in complex SES to respond to the need for context sensitive 
approaches  [1].  We require  our  model  1)  to  address  a 
challenge that is common across a wide range of SES, 2) to 
incorporate  relevant  theoretical  explanations  and  3)  to 
include  relevant  contextual  variables,  without  losing  the 
ability to systematically explore the challenge [2]. 
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In  this  talk  we  will  present  this  approach  using  an 
agent-based  model  that  combines  a  theoretical  model  of 
norm-driven cooperation (CP-norm) [3] with a model of an 
irrigation  dilemma  that  captures  the  main  features  of 
irrigation  in  Bali  [4],  where  farmers  (self)  manage  their 
water resources to grow rice while avoiding pest outbreaks 
by  synchronising  their  cropping  schedules  [5].  We 
contextualise the theoretical model using Bali empirics  [5]
to investigate the role of cooperation for the performance of 
one  irrigation  community.  We  do  so  by  slowly  adding 
relevant  contextual  details,  such  as  aspects of the  natural  
resource dynamics or  social  interactions  to the theoretical 
model.  Particularly, for  this  conference,  we focus on  the 
effect  of introducing  ecological  complexity by embedding 
empirical  based  resource  dynamics  from  the 
Lansing-Kremer  model  [4] reproduced  by Janssen  [6] in 
CP-norm.
II. BACKGROUND
A. SES challenges exemplified by the Bali case
The  Bali  case  was  selected  because  it  represents  a 
classical SES challenge, namely a social dilemma that has 
already been intensively studied empirically  [5].  The Bali 
case represents a case of successful resource management. It 
is in that sense an example of a solution to avoid a ‘tragedy 
of  the  commons’,  through  a  self-organised  process  that 
restrains actors from taking the amount of water that would 
be (short-term)  optimal  for an  individual,  but harmful  for 
the  collective  [7].  However,  despite  its  successes  on 
watershed  level,  on  the  level  of  individual  farmer 
communities  (subaks)  differences  in  performance  can  be 
observed  in  situations  with  similar  social  and  ecological 
conditions  [8]. Our hypothesis is that  the ability to engage 
in  collective  action  is  a  major  factor  explaining  these 
differences  [2].  The  combination  of  available  empirical 
knowledge  and  an  open  question  exploring  the 
circumstances for successful self-organisation  allows us to 
develop and test our approach to develop context sensitive 
(not  too generic,  not  too specific)  understanding  of SES 
social dilemmas.
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B. Theory of cooperation & the CP-norm model
The capacity for collective action, particularly with respect 
to sticking to a chosen cropping plan (cooperation), has 
been identified as a possible factor explaining differences in 
performance of communities in Bali. Cooperation research 
studies how people decide to act cooperative or not and how 
this arises/adapts over time, i.e., evolution of cooperation, 
see [9]-[13] for an overview. We are particularly interested 
in theories identify mechanisms that can sustain 
cooperation in a social dilemma (see e.g. [14]). . 
 CP-norm  is  an  agent-based  implementation  of  an 
evolutionary  game theoretic  model  [15] that  explores  the 
conditions  under  which  a  social  norm  enforced  through 
ostracism  (social  punishment  driven  by  disapproval) 
facilitates sustainable use of a  common-pool resource,  see 
Fig. 1. Cooperator agents need to restrain from selfish profit 
maximization  to  achieve  socially  optimal  resource 
extraction  levels.  Defectors  that  extract  higher  levels  are 
punished  if the  frequency of cooperators  is  large enough, 
hence  when  the  community  has  the  social  capital  to  act  
against  defectors.  The strength  of punishment  depends on 
the level of cooperation and the degree of norm violation. 
Under certain conditions full cooperation, full defection or a 
mixed equilibrium can be sustained.  
We have selected this theoretical model because it includes 
the  mechanisms  that  we  consider  most  relevant  for 
explaining the capacity of Bali farmers to collectively adapt  
and manage their resources. Ostracism or social disapproval 
has  been  hypothesised  as  an  important  mechanism 
facilitating collective action in Balinese communities  [16]. 
Additionally, graduated sanctioning  has  been identified as 
an  important  variable  for  self-organisation  in  empirical 
research on common pool resources [17], [18].
III. A MODEL OF COOPERATION IN BALI IRRIGATION (COBA-I)
The agent-based model of cooperation in Bali irrigation 
(COBA-I) aims to capture relevant contextual details in the 
Bali case while addressing a social dilemma. 
In  COBA-I  we  adopt  the  social  mechanism  for 
cooperation of the CP-norm model and gradually introduce 
complexity. In  other  words,  we gradually introduce more 
details of both the social and ecological contexts, using the 
descriptive knowledge of the Bali context  [5] and elements 
of the Bali3/Kremer-Lansing  model of Bali  irrigation  [4], 
[6]. As a first step we test the role of the social mechanisms  
of  cooperation  within  an  environmental  context  that  is 
based on the ecology of Bali. The ecological dynamics are 
represented by the water flow variability and pestdynamics. 
Water availability is affected by rainfall-scenarios as well as 
the characteristics of the landscape (elevation, groundwater 
flow). Pest dynamics that affect rice harvest depend on the 
level of synchronisation  among the farmers  (having  crops 
and fallow periods at the same time).
The main  elements of the model are the resource (water),  
the  agents  (farmers)  and  the world they live in  (Balinese 
irrigation  context).  The  group  of  farmers  represents  one 
farmer community, i.e., Subak. Farmers can choose between 
one  of two behavioral  strategies:  the  cooperative  strategy 
where they stick to the agreed upon cropping  plan  of the 
community  and  the  non-cooperative  strategy  where  they 
choose a  different  cropping  plan  with  an  additional  crop 
rotation. Fig. 2 describes the main processes of the COBA 
model.  Each month (= time step) the farmers have a water 
demand  determined  by  the  needs  of  the  crop  (rice) 
depending  on where they are  in  their  cropping  plan.  The 
water availability is determined by rainfall (scenario-based) 
and  groundwater  flow (elevation  based).  Water  is  either 
extracted or flowing out downstream. The rice crop grows 
according to the amount of water each farmer can extract.  
Once  a  year (every  12  time  steps)  two  farmers  meet 
randomly  and  evaluate  their  behavioural  strategy,  i.e. 
cropping plan,  by comparing their success with that  of the 
other.  The  success  or  utility of each  farmer  is  calculated 
based on the returns from its rice harvest and the incurred 
costs.  Rice harvest  is  a  function  of water  availability, i.e.  
water scarcity leads to less rice to harvest. Costs may arise 
when a farmer is ostracised (sanctioned) because it deviates 
from  the  agreed  cropping  plan,  i.e.  followed  the 
non-cooperative behavioural strategy. Sanctioning, however, 
only occurs if the group of agents following a cooperative 
strategy  is  large  enough  (social  capital)  to  collectively 
sanction the farmers that deviate from the agreed cropping 
plan. Costs can also arise due to the outbreak of pests. Pests 
can  only  be  ‘managed  when  fallow  periods  are 
synchronised.  The  non-cooperative  strategy  farmers  can 
Fig. 2. Proces diagramme of the COBA-I model. Every time step (a month) farmers behave (take out water), resource is updated and 
rice grows. Every 12 time-steps (a year) each farmer calculates its harvest and has a chance to meet and update its behaviour strategy.
Fig. 1. The main feedback mechanisms of the CP-norm model. The inner 
positive social feedback loop leads to an increase in cooperators, while the 
outer negative ecological feedback loop leads to an increase in defectors.
Miguel, Amblard, Barceló & Madella (eds.) Advances in Computational Social Science and Social Simulation
Barcelona: Autònoma University of Barcelona, 2014, DDD repository <http://ddd.uab.cat/record/125597>
choose  favors  pest  growth  that  affects  every  agent 
(regardless of their strategy).
 
When introducing the Bali rainfall patterns we expect that  
the model will still show the 3 outcomes of the theoretical 
model  (full-cooperation,  full-defection  and  a  mixed 
equilibrium), however given the fluctuations of the system 
state  regions  will  differ.  The  model  is  currently  in  its 
verification stage. This includes tests of the reproduction of 
the resource dynamics from the Bali3 model as well as the 
cooperation  mechanisms  of  the  contextualised  CP-norm. 
The  social  mechanisms  are  of  particular  interest.  Fig  1 
illustrates some first explorations of these interactions. The 
cooperation behaviour strategy becomes dominant (blue line 
on  top)  in  the  community  over  time  when  the  initial  
proportion  of  cooperative  strategies  in  the  community  is 
high.  The  rainfall  scenario,  however,  seems  to  effect  the 
speed at which a dominant  cooperative strategy converges. 
Particularly,  the  presence  of  waterstress  (low  rainfall 
scenario)  increases  the  convergence  to  a  cooperative 
strategy (compare Fig 1a and  1b).  This  is consistent  with 
the  unpublished  findings  of  CP-norm  [3].  Under  water 
stress  the  costs  of non-cooperation  weigh  in  stronger,  as 
returns from harvesting are reduced.   
Although these are just initial explorations, they are a sneak 
preview  for  our  further  explorations.  These  explorations 
will  focus on reflecting  on the cooperation  mechanism in 
CP-norn  by contextualising.  For instance,  CP-norm shows 
overall  high  dominance  of  the  non-cooperative  strategy. 
Particularly, when  relaxing  the  strength  of the  ostracism,  
with  low  resource  variability  CP-norm  converges  to 
non-cooperative behavioural strategies. In general, COBA-I 
behaviour  is  consistent  with  CP-norm by reproducing  the 
importance  of  the  size  of  the  initial  proportion  of  a 
particular  behaviour  strategy  (affecting  the  ability  to 
ostracise) as well as the response to low levels of resource 
affecting all and particularly taking away the advantage of 
the non-cooperative strategy. We were able to reproduce the 
community  patterns  of  all  cooperative  strategies,  all 
non-cooperative  strategies  and  a  mixed  equilibrium, 
however the regions seem to differ. We will explore under 
what conditions cooperation arises in COBA-I,compare the 
difference with the conditions of CP-norm and reflect on the 
role of context in explaining  these differences between the 
theoretical  model (cp-norm) and  the contextualised model 
(COBA-I).
Fig 3. First explorations of the COBA-I model varying the rainfall_scenario {low, high} and the initial amount of farmers with a cooperative 
behaviour strategy {low, high}.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Our presentation at the conference aims at demonstrating 
our  approach  of  developing  tools  to  understand  the 
dynamics of coupled social-ecological systems at a level of 
complexity that  does justice to  real  world  contexts  while 
still  allowing us to draw some more general  conclusions. 
The iteration between abstract, general models and a given 
context raises a lot of food for thought in reflecting on the 
consequences of model design choices. 
The  process  of  contextualising  CP-norm  triggers  both 
theoretical and empirical questions. On the theoretical side 
exploring the effect the increased complexity of the resource 
dynamics has  on CP-norm in  itself,  e.g.  it  might  explore 
situations that  were outside of the scope of the theoretical 
context. The other way around, the choices we make in for 
instance  operationalising  cooperation  raise  empirical 
questions. For instance, what is ‘cooperation’ in the case? It 
can refer  to different  types of processes in  groups,  can  be 
studied  on  many  levels.  Which  aspect  of  cooperation  in 
resource  use  is  most  relevant  for  explaining  performance 
differences in the Bali context? For instance, in the Balinese 
context  cooperation  involves more  than  just  sticking  to a 
particular  cropping plan.  It also involves attending weekly 
subak meetings,  perform rituals,  maintain  canals  etc.  [5]. 
Furthermore,  cooperation  in  our  model  only refers  to the 
community  level.  In  future  it  will  be  important  to 
investigate  different  (possibly  conflicting)  levels  of 
cooperation  (within  community, between communities and 
system level). 
Our  immediate  next  steps  involve  more  systematic 
sensitivity analysis and experiments to understand COBA-I. 
From there we will continue with gradually increasing the 
richness of the context so that we can explore what level of 
complexity is needed to explain the observed differences in 
performance  between  communities.  Particularly,  we  will 
focus on including  more realism on the social  side by for 
instance,  introducing  social  structure.  This  will  directly 
affect who the farmer is more likely to meet and thereby the 
reconsideration of the behaviour strategy will be based on 
the social vicinity.
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